

another: we have all the material and we have just had an election, and perhaps now all the mistakes can be corrected. President Thieu will have the power he lacked before and we can get him to do these things which all his predecessors have failed to do. Thieu can use power; he can crush the little warlords.

Perhaps so, but one senses in Thieu a clever operator who will play it close to his vest. His ability to perform these late miracles is questionable. Give him six months, one very high American says. But what is it going to be at the end of it? Something dramatic—or just more statistics and briefings?

There are a few good things happening, friends of mine in our Mission say. At this writing, the National Assembly elections are stirring feelings never stirred here before. They are touching basic regional and factional feelings in this pluralistic society—and for the first time giving people a sense of representation in the government. These developments are certainly to be encouraged, for they might be the one thing which could save us in a political showdown with the Communists. But, otherwise, they amount to a very small plus in a very tired country.

They say also that there are changes within the Mission; the real dissenters are getting a better hearing in Mission councils than ever before. Yet there is little in what the Mission says, or thinks to support this hope. I fear for the dissenters in the months ahead as the pressure for results intensifies; for that kind of pressure does not want to hear dissent or complicated answers. It wants reams of prepared statistical documents, and it most surely will get them.

VIII

And the alternate solutions?

Putting American and Vietnamese troops together into joint units, thereby improving the morale of the Vietnamese—where tried so far in this country it has worked. . . . Giving the Americans complete command of Vietnamese forces, and giving them good American leadership. . . . forgetting about the Vietnamese and bringing out one million more American troops and do the job right.

But instead I have a sense that we are once again coming to a dead end in Indochina. We have in the past narrowly staved off defeat several times in the South. In 1954 at Geneva, in 1956 with Dien, in 1961 with the Taylor report and the beginning of the American buildup, in 1965 with the commitment of American combat troops. Each time we have averted defeat and grabbed victory out of the hands of Hanoi, but in doing it, we have always been forced to up the price of the game, we have increased the stakes, so that now we stand with the present frustrating situation, neither victory nor defeat, a half-million troops, a heavy bombing program, with the military wanting more troops and more bombing. Yet meanwhile we are more aware than ever of the frustrations of that particular war and of the strains that a commitment of half a million men places on our own society at home.

Or perhaps all the very best critics, such as the late Bernard Fall, will be proven wrong: you can gain a military victory without any decent political basis. You can simply grind out a terribly punishing war, year after year, using that immense American firepower, crushing the enemy and a good deal of the population, until finally there has been so much death and destruction that the enemy will stumble out of the forest, as stunned and numb as the rest of the Vietnamese people.

What would become of the country in this case I do not know. It could happen, but I doubt it. For though the highest Americans here have talked in terms of victory through a war of punishment and attrition, I have my doubts that we can win in a war of attrition. Attrition, after all, is not just a physical thing, it is a psychological state as

well, and I wonder if they will fold first. Rather, the war is to them an immediate thing; it is their highest priority, their most important commitment, like the Israelis viewing the Arabs; they see it in terms of *survival*, while we are far away. We have our other fronts, other commitments, other priorities. We talk about this as a war of our national security, but we treat it as a war of luxury. Nothing shows this more than the casual way the war has been reported from Saigon to Washington, the willingness to pass on gentle fallacies instead of hard and cold truths. The general who tried to have Earl Young removed would, I am sure, give a very accurate report to Washington if the Vietnamese were moving north from San Diego.

Perhaps. Perhaps. I do not think we are winning, and the reasons seem to me to be so basic that while I would like to believe my friends that there is a last chance opening up again in Vietnam, it seems to me a frail hope indeed. I do not think we are winning in any true sense, nor do I see any signs we are about to win. That is why this is such a sad story to write, for I share that special affection for the Vietnamese, and I would like to write that though the price is heavy, it is worth it. I do not think our Vietnamese can win their half of the war, nor do I think we can win it for them. I think finally we will end up lowering our sights, encouraging our Vietnamese to talk to their Vietnamese, hoping somehow they can settle what we cannot. That is what this country longs for right now, and it may well be that even if we stay here another five years, it is all we will end up with anyway.

ARM

ARMS RACE?

(Mr. COHELAN (at the request of Mr. PUCINSKI) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. COHELAN. Mr. Speaker, one of the most ominous prospects facing us today is what appears to be a new round in the nuclear arms race.

Recent months have seen the disclosure of new weapons and defenses by both the United States and the Soviet Union. These events have passed with little public stir. Yet these events are critical to the future security of the world.

Mr. Rosewell L. Gilpatrick, former Deputy Secretary of Defense, has written in the New York Times magazine an excellent summary of these events, together with some observations on their meaning.

I commend this article to the attention of my colleagues and insert it in the RECORD at this point:

THE ATOMIC ARMS RACE: A "MAD MOMENTUM" MAY BE UNDERWAY

(By Rosewell L. Gilpatrick)

Both the United States and the Soviet Union have said repeatedly that they share common aims in avoiding an atomic arms race, preventing nuclear war and reducing the amount of their national resources now devoted to military uses. But no formal agreement to that end exists or is in prospect, and meanwhile the actions of the two superpowers are inconsistent with their aims. The present trends in the United States and Russia toward more and better nuclear armaments would not only jeopardize the accomplishment of the nonproliferation treaty which they are jointly advocating but could well signify a turn for the worse in their own strategic relationship. Let us examine both sides of this two-sided looking glass.

The United States is now ahead of the

Soviet Union by a ratio of 3 or 4 to 1 in numbers of nuclear warheads, sometimes called target kill capability. In terms of megatonnage, however, the Soviet Union's nuclear arsenal may already be on a par with or possibly ahead of the United States'.

In keeping with its strategic objective of maintaining a second-strike capability through the assured destruction of Soviet missile sites, the United States is proceeding with a number of qualitative advances in its strategic weapons. It is equipping our Minuteman III's, the most advanced of that family of ICBM's, with devices that will enable them to penetrate Soviet missile defenses. It is pushing the development of Poseidon submarine-launched ICBM's which will surpass Polaris missiles in range, destructive power and targeting accuracy. Also in the works is a new concept of multiple warheads for American missiles—called Multiple Independent Re-entry Vehicles (MIRV's)—that will multiply the effectiveness of our present ICBM's without adding to the number of launchers. The MIRV missile will be designed to carry from 5 to 10 warheads that can be separated in flight to strike independently at a corresponding number of widely dispersed, preselected targets.

In view of this development and because American strategy does not depend on retaining our existing overwhelming quantitative superiority, our Government is not at the moment contemplating any major additions to the size of its missile force. In the early research and development stage, however, there is exploratory work going forward on a new long-range missile (Strat X), the nature of which is highly classified but which presumably would be more effective and less vulnerable to counterattack than existing ICBM's. Similar effort continues on the propulsion system and avionics for a more advanced long-range bomber in the event it is later decided that still another generation of manned strategic-weapon delivery systems is needed.

For its part, the Soviet Union is stressing a major quantitative improvement in its strategic offensive forces. It is adding more hardened land-based and submarine-launched ICBM's in an attempt to reduce the present disparity between its missile forces and those of the United States. It is still emphasizing large warheads—that is, megatonnage rather than precision targeting—in its missiles, and it continues to stress advanced missile development, as shown by the new missiles exhibited at the 50th-anniversary military parade in Moscow on Nov. 7.

Rather than seeking to match United States capability in long-range manned bombers, the Soviets are apparently initiating a system of delivering nuclear warheads from orbit. The delivery vehicle for such a weapon would be fired in a low orbit, about 100 miles above the earth, from which its bomb would be released against unprotected targets, such as American bomber bases, with a flight time considerably less than that of an ICBM. This system, which our Defense Department calls a Fractional Orbital Bombardment System (FOBS), would thus materially reduce the 15-minute warning time that now enables American bombers to become airborne prior to the impact of any Soviet missile attack on the United States.

There are also significant differences in the approaches being followed by the two countries with respect to their strategic defenses. The United States has decided to go ahead with a limited or "thin" deployment of antiballistic missiles (ABM's) consisting of from 10 to 15 sets of missile batteries and radar installations so located throughout the country as to be able, thanks to the 400-mile range of the interceptor missiles, to protect the entire nation. The defensive missiles will be provided with a new nuclear warhead designed to destroy incoming missiles by releasing bursts of X-rays. Although this area mis-

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sile defense system, called Sentinel, is conceived primarily as a countermeasure to Chinese Communist nuclear development rather than as a shield against a Soviet missile attack, it has been intimated that even such a limited deployment of ABM's would provide, as a concurrent benefit, a further defense of our Minuteman sites against Soviet ICBM's. No significant radioactive fallout is anticipated from the operation of the Sentinel system so that no great increase in our shelter program would be needed. To defend against the Russian orbital bomb, if that materializes, the United States will rely on over-the-horizon radar, which will give as much warning time as we now would have in the case of an ICBM attack, and on its existing capability of destroying spaceborne weapons.

When it comes to ABM's, the Soviets have already gone well beyond United States planning by deploying a full-scale set of ABM installations around Moscow and Leningrad, and the Russians may be extending another antimissile system around most of western Russia. Eventually the Soviets will undoubtedly set up systems to defend against Chinese Communist missiles.

Meanwhile, there are considerable pressures on both Governments to build up their nuclear stockpiles even further. Within the Soviet Union the military still constitutes a powerful force, with probably more influence under the present collective leadership of Podgorny, Brezhnev and Kosygin than in the heyday of Khrushchev as undisputed top man in the Politburo.

In the United States, military influence on national security policy is likewise strong, particularly through organizations dominated by retired officers and through Congressional committees. In recent months there has appeared under the aegis of the American Security Council a report, entitled "The Changing Strategic Military Balance—U.S. vs. U.S.S.R.," which reached the conclusion that in terms of megatonnage the Soviets have already wiped out the United States margin of security in nuclear arms, and warning of further Soviet gains in strategic weapons. Among those associated with this report and the American Security Council were such former Air Force leaders as Generals LeMay, Powers and Schriever.

Later, another report came out, also predicting that, if present trends continue, the Soviets will soon surpass the United States in numbers of ICBM's. This report was prepared by the Center for Strategic Studies at Georgetown University, a group headed by Adm. Arleigh Burke, retired Chief of Naval Operations.

Several Congressional groups are currently active along parallel lines. A subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee, headed by Congressman Porter Hardy, Jr., is continuing in executive session a comprehensive review of the entire United States strategic position. The Military Applications Subcommittee of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, chaired by Senator Henry M. Jackson, which is conducting a full-scale inquiry into the ABM issues, has been told that the Soviet Union is deliberately challenging the nuclear superiority of the United States. The Preparedness Subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee, under Senator John Stennis, can be expected to be heard from to the same effect.

The net effect of these activities and attitudes is to keep the Johnson Administration under constant pressure to demonstrate that its actions with respect to strategic weapons will not shift the military balance in favor of the Soviet Union. From the time it was announced early this year, President Johnson's effort to persuade the Soviet Union to accept a moratorium on the deployment of ABM's has been regarded with growing skepticism in Congressional and military circles. The timing of recent announcements on strategic weapons system developments reflects the concern within the executive

branch over these Congressional-military points of view. Secretary McNamara's September speech in San Francisco announcing the Administration's decision to deploy a thin ABM system followed by a few days a talk in Connecticut by Senator John O. Pastore, the chairman of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, strongly urging a full ABM deployment. The October announcement of Secretary McNamara that the Soviets were apparently testing FOBS barely preceded the start of the hearings on the ABM issues by Senator Jackson's subcommittee.

These pressures, which are naturally fed by resentment at Soviet aid to North Vietnam, will grow in intensity both in the near term as the Johnson Administration formulates the portion of its fiscal 1969 military budget dealing with strategic forces, and during the Presidential election campaign next year. Unless the still-to-be-begun American-Soviet talks on halting the growth in nuclear arms produce some dramatic results, the likelihood is that United States military plans and programs for the future will put more rather than less emphasis on offensive and defensive strategic weapons.

The prospects of nuclear arms restraint on the Soviet side are even less encouraging. In the first place, the current Russian arms budget is up at least 15 per cent, and all the indications point to a continuation of the Soviet military's ability to claim an increasing share of their national resources. No one on the civilian side of the Soviet leadership seems capable or willing to control the appetites of their military. Furthermore, arms decisions within the Soviet Union, as is true also in the United States, will continue to be made in the context of each country's policy with respect to "wars of national liberation." The clash of such policies finds its immediate expression in the Vietnam conflict. Although that war is being waged with conventional weapons, the effect of each side's moves on the other is strongly influenced by the balance of nuclear power backing up the respective positions of the two main protagonists.

Indeed, it can well be argued that the interaction between conventionally armed and nuclear forces is such that the trends in each cannot long move in opposite directions. In the American military budget, the support for nuclear strategic forces has been progressively reduced from \$11.2-billion in 1962 to \$7.1-billion in 1967, while the sums appropriated for nonnuclear general purpose forces nearly doubled, rising from \$18-billion in 1962 to \$34.3 billion in 1967. The increase has, among other things, financed a 45 per cent increase in Army combat divisions (from 11 to 16), a 73 per cent increase in naval ship construction and modernization and a 40 per cent increase in Air Force tactical squadrons. Now the indications are that the strategic curve will also turn upward; for the current fiscal year the cost of United States strategic forces will go up by \$1-billion, or 15 per cent.

On the Soviet side, the pattern has been one of adding to both the nuclear and non-nuclear forces. Besides setting out to overcome the United States' nuclear lead, the Soviets are seeking, through long-range air-lift and seabased air power, to emulate our capability of projecting conventional military power on a global scale.

One of the most frightening aspects of the American-Soviet military equation is the inexorable rhythm of its measures and countermeasures. Secretary McNamara calls it the "mad momentum intrinsic to the development of all new nuclear weaponry."

Starting with Sputnik I, the history of the missile age has been characterized by a series of American reactions to Soviet moves and vice versa. The pioneer effort by the United States in submarine-launched missiles was a response to the vulnerability of the first-generation ICBM's with their soft sites and

flammable fuels. As successive generations of ICBM's became less vulnerable, the Russians proceeded along parallel lines of producing larger warheads with greater destructive power and at the same time strengthening their missile defenses. United States missile development, on the other hand, has emphasized continuing improvement in penetrability to counter more sophisticated Soviet defenses.

The United States reaction to the recent disclosure that the Soviets are testing a new kind of space weapon—FOBS—is but another illustration of how inescapable is the pattern of response. Although Secretary McNamara does not regard the development as one that should cause concern for the state of American security, Senator Richard B. Russell, chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, expressed a viewpoint common to many of his colleagues when he insisted that the United States' reply to the latest Soviet arms challenge should be for us to develop our own orbital bomb.

So much depends in these matters on from which side of the looking glass one views a power struggle such as that going on in Vietnam or in the Middle East, where the two superpowers also have major interests and where, in the eyes of President Johnson, the same kind of issues are at stake. What the United States considers an effort to keep the peace or to protect independent nations from externally generated aggression looks to the Russians like another projection of American military power as well as an intervention in the internal affairs of sovereign states. Similarly, in the light of the overseas base structure built up by the United States during the cold-war period, its current disavowals of any intention to maintain military bases in Southeast Asia cannot carry much conviction in Russian minds.

The Soviet Union is not the only one to indulge in ambivalent attitudes. For its part, the United States makes scarcely credible distinctions between the military aid which it furnishes to its friends and the arms which the Soviet Union provides to those on its side. Thus, while fielding an American Army of nearly half a million soldiers in South Vietnam, supported by a naval force of 100 vessels and thousands of aircraft, we take umbrage at what the Soviets are doing on a far smaller scale for the North Vietnamese.

The prospects, then, are poor that either the United States or the Soviet Government will find itself in the immediate future so domestically positioned as to be able to level off, far less scale down, its nuclear arms program. Should the Johnson Administration go slow in developing and procuring more and better strategic weapons, it will be accused by its critics among the military and the Congress and by its opponents in the Presidential campaign of shifting from a strategy of "nuclear superiority" to one of "nuclear parity" with the Soviet Union. On the other hand, the Soviet leadership can hardly be expected, without some reciprocal move by the United States, to relax its efforts to overcome or at least narrow the margin of nuclear advantage which the United States now enjoys.

In these circumstances, is there any alternative to a continuation, if not an intensification, of the arms race beyond the now somewhat forlorn hope that considerations of logic and economic self-interest might prevail in both Washington and Moscow? The only new factor in the equation is the growing nuclear power of Red China, which, on account of its proximity, constitutes a more immediate threat to the Russians than to the Americans. From an ideological viewpoint, it seems inconceivable that even a common threat from Red China could cause the Soviet Union and the United States to mitigate their current competition in arms. Certainly, in the case of the Soviet Union, it would take an overriding sense of national

self-interest for it to make common cause with the United States to the detriment of Communist China. The United States has taken a step in that direction by orienting its missile defenses against the Chinese rather than the Soviets. Could we go further, and if so, would the Soviets reciprocate?

Questions such as these must be pondered by whatever national Administration presides over American destinies after the 1968 Presidential election. One operative factor will still be a source of great difficulty for our leadership. In view of its present superiority in nuclear arms, the initiative toward deflecting downward the nuclear arms race will continue to rest on the United States. A Presidential campaign is not the ideal environment or the exercise of such an initiative; yet it is to be hoped that the Johnson Administration will not be deterred by political considerations at home from pursuing its objective of avoiding another step-up in nuclear armament. Less hopeful but equally desirable is the possibility that the Republican candidate would run on a platform embracing a similar objective.

SLEEPING BEAR DUNES NATIONAL LAKESHORE PARK

(Mr. O'HARA of Michigan (at the request of Mr. PUCINSKI) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the Record and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. O'HARA of Michigan. Mr. Speaker, the proposal for creation of Sleeping Bear Dunes National Lakeshore in Michigan has been on the legislative agenda for many sessions of Congress. It was first introduced by Senator PHILIP HART in the 86th Congress. Senator HART has introduced it in the Senate in subsequent Congresses, and this session I introduced companion legislation in the House of Representatives. There have been extensive hearings on the proposal in the Interior Committees of both Houses of Congress. The legislation has been passed by the Senate in the last two Congresses. Last year it was reported to the House by the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, but never came to the floor. It is my hope—and I am optimistic—that this Congress will make the proposed Sleeping Bear Dunes National Lakeshore a reality.

The proposal has widespread support, not only in Michigan, but throughout the entire upper Midwest and Great Lakes States. Citizens of this vast area realize that it is essential that this magnificent area of sand dunes, forest, lakes, and hills be preserved in its present near-natural state. They want it open to all the people and held for all the people for all time. Finally, most people in the Great Lakes region realize that creation of the national lakeshore will have a significant, beneficial impact on the economy of the Great Lakes States. Indicative of the extent, variety, and quality of support are two resolutions which I recently received. One resolution was passed by the Michigan Conservation Commission, the other by the Upper Great Lakes Regional Commission. It is important to note that the regional commission includes three Governors—all of whom signed the resolution—Gov. George Romney, of Michigan; Gov. Harold LeVander, of Minnesota; and Gov. Warren P. Knowles, of Wisconsin.

I sincerely hope that when the list of

major conservation legislation is posted by the 90th Congress, Sleeping Bear Dunes National Lakeshore will be on it.

Mr. Speaker, I insert copies of these two resolutions urging creation of the Sleeping Bear Dunes National Lakeshore in Michigan, along with a letter from Ralph A. MacMullan, director of the Michigan Department of Conservation, to be printed in the Record:

DEPARTMENT OF CONSERVATION,
Lansing, Mich., December 4, 1967.

Hon. JAMES G. O'HARA,
U.S. House of Representatives,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR REPRESENTATIVE O'HARA: Attached is a copy of a resolution adopted by the Michigan Conservation Commission urging the establishment of the Sleeping Bear Dunes National Lakeshore. A similar resolution which was recently adopted by the Upper Great Lakes Regional Commission is also enclosed.

I would respectfully recommend that the enactment of this legislation be given top priority in the Ninetieth Congress. There is no other conceivable act of Congress which could do more to implement the orderly development of the outdoor recreational resources of the State of Michigan. The project would, indeed, be the focal point for tourism in the entire mid-continent area.

Please call on me if I can assist in any way with the advancement of this important project proposal.

Sincerely,

RALPH A. MACMULLAN,
Director.

RESOLUTION URGING LEGISLATION TO ESTABLISH THE SLEEPING BEAR DUNES NATIONAL LAKESHORE

Whereas, Legislation to establish the Sleeping Bear Dunes National Lakeshore has been continuously considered by the Congress since 1960; and

Whereas, The present identical bills (S. 1192 and H.R. 6616) are the product of exhaustive studies and extensive hearings and have been tailored to satisfy the reasonable objections of local residents; and

Whereas, The Sleeping Bear Dunes area, so unique from both a scenic and scientific point of view, is of national scope and significance and clearly warrants designation as a national lakeshore; and

Whereas, The State of Michigan does not presently have the fiscal capability of developing this area up to its full potential for recreation; and

Whereas, The Sleeping Bear Dunes area as a federal project area, will be a focal point for tourism for over twenty million people that live within an easy one day's drive of this beautiful area; and

Whereas, The Upper Great Lakes Regional Commission has recently endorsed the establishment of the lakeshore as a measure which would serve as a stimulus to the economy of northern Michigan; and now therefore be it

Resolved, That the Michigan Conservation Commission urges the Ninetieth Congress to enact legislation establishing the Sleeping Bear Dunes National Lakeshore.

UPPER GREAT LAKES REGIONAL COMMISSION RESOLUTION 13

A resolution of the Upper Great Lakes Regional Commission to recommend establishment of the Sleeping Bear Dunes National Lakeshore

Whereas, the Upper Great Lakes Regional Commission is instructed by the Congress (under Section 503(a)(6) of the Public Works and Economic Development Act of 1965) to "prepare legislative and other recommendations with respect to both short-range and long-range programs and projects"; and

Whereas, the Upper Great Lakes Regional

Commission is concerned with the increase of economic activity in the Region; and

Whereas, part of such increase depends upon the orderly development and preservation of areas of natural beauty for the purpose of strengthening the tourist industry; and

Whereas, the Sleeping Bear Dunes area in Benzie and Leelanau Counties in Michigan is a rare and priceless resource of natural beauty; and

Whereas, national legislation would provide for the preservation and development of this area; Now Therefore

Be it resolved by the Upper Great Lakes Regional Commission that establishment of the Sleeping Bear Dunes National Lakeshore be recommended to the Congress; and

Be it further resolved, that full action be taken to minimize any possible adverse effects on private property owners and local units of government resulting from the establishment of the Sleeping Bear Dunes as a National Lakeshore.

Adopted by the full Commission this 22 day of September 1967.

WARREN P. KNOWLES,
State cochairman and Governor of the
State of Wisconsin.

GEORGE ROMNEY,
Governor of the State of Michigan.

THOMAS S. FRANCIS,
Federal Cochairman.

HAROLD LEVANDER,
Governor of the State of Minnesota.

(Mr. O'HARA of Michigan (at the request of Mr. PUCINSKI) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the Record and to include extraneous matter.)

[Mr. O'HARA of Michigan's remarks will appear hereafter in the Appendix.]

MEATPACKING AND PROCESSING

(Mr. SMITH of Iowa (at the request of Mr. PUCINSKI) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the Record and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. SMITH of Iowa. Mr. Speaker, most of the meatpacking and processing plants which are represented in Washington on an organized basis are represented by the American Meat Institute, the Western States Meat Packers Association, or the National Independent Meat Packers Association.

These three associations represented the red meat packers and processors who opposed the passage of the Smith-Foley meat inspection bill. Nick Kotz of the Des Moines Register dug out facts relating to these associations and the extent to which their members were among those which were subjected to the inspections of nonfederally inspected plants. These plants were selected at random and researching that resulted in a comparison of membership in each organization with plants sited in the reports was obviously a time consuming and tedious task for which the newspaper is to be commended.

I have previously placed in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD the news stories relating to the AMI and WSMIPA membership. Although the bill has now passed the Congress and is awaiting the President's signature, I believe the recent news story making the same comparison of the NIMPA's members cited should in all fairness be placed in the Record so

that the RECORD will treat all alike and show the overall picture.

It will be noted that a total of only 945 companies are listed as members of the three associations. This means that most plants were not members of any of the groups but I do not know exactly how many were the nonfederally inspected plants which will now be subject to inspection. It will be noted, however, that the percentage of nonfederally inspected plants cited unfavorably was high from the plants selected at random.

I also wish to state that some of the plants state that they have now corrected the situation cited unfavorably. Some State laws have been changed but most of the conditions cited should not have existed with or without a State law.

Under the final version of the meat inspection bill, the USDA has a duty to examine the nonfederally inspected plants periodically and report the findings to Congress. This includes a duty to make purchases of products from retail outlets and make laboratory tests to determine the extent to which the labeling is accurate and sufficient. I hope the possibility that improper practices will become known to consumers will cause the nonfederally inspected plants to conduct a better operation during the 2-year period pending mandatory inspection under more adequate minimum standards. The possibility of penetrating articles setting forth information should have some affect. Following is another example and the last of the series of articles concerning practices by some of the members of these three associations:

[From the Des Moines Register, Dec. 7, 1967]

REVEAL NEW INSTANCES OF DIRTY MEAT (By Nick Kotz)

WASHINGTON, D.C.—Agriculture Department (USDA) investigators have reported finding improper conditions in 54 meat plants operated by members of the National Independent Meat Packers Association (N.I.M.P.A.), a trade association that opposed strong inspection legislation.

USDA investigators cited 39 N.I.M.P.A. members in a 1962 survey of conditions in plants exempted from federal inspection, and cited 15 plants in a 1967 survey. Five N.I.M.P.A. members were praised for good conditions in their plants

CHECKED LIST

The Register checked the status of N.I.M.P.A. members by comparing the organization's confidential membership list with the USDA survey of plant conditions.

In earlier stories, The Register revealed that 50 members of the American Meat Institute (A.M.I.) and 45 members of the Western States Meat Packers Association were cited for improper conditions.

The results of these surveys indicate that numerous members of the three major trade associations who lobby in Washington will have to make corrective changes under the new meat inspection law that eventually will require all plants to meet federal standards. All three organizations initially opposed strong meat inspection legislation, and only the A.M.I. supported it in the end.

The USDA-surveys are more revealing of the three organizations when consideration is given to their total membership and the number of plants surveyed.

In 1962 and 1967, the Agriculture Department surveyed conditions in a total of only 1,200 of the nation's 16,000 meat packing

plants. Plants were selected at random for the surveys.

SECRET MEMBERSHIP

The three lobbying groups have a total membership of only 945 companies. Yet USDA investigators reported improper conditions in plants operated by 50 of A.M.I.'s 350 members, 45 of Western States 295 members, and 54 of N.I.M.P.A.'s 300 members.

All three organizations declined to disclose either to Congress or to The Register the names of their members. In each case, the names of the member firms were obtained from other sources by this newspaper.

Several congressional advocates of strong consumer legislation began raising questions privately the last three weeks about the status of lobbying groups that represent special interests in Washington, yet decline to identify those they do represent.

N.I.M.P.A. carried on some of its lobbying against a strong meat inspection bill in close coordination with the National Association of State Department of Agriculture.

It is reported that Representative Neal Smith (Dem., Ia.) particularly had N.I.M.P.A. in mind when he said that some state secretaries of agriculture "jumped every time the meat lobby said to."

LOUISIANA FIRM

Among N.I.M.P.A. members cited in the Agriculture Department investigations was the Rapides Packing Co., Alexandria, La.

Of this plant, investigators reported in 1967: "Except for the killing floor, the plant is old and visibly filthy. All of the walls are stained with greenish slime caused by humidity and condensation. Contamination of food products is inevitable."

Agriculture Department investigators made the following 1967 report about the W. H. Butcher Packing Co., Oklahoma City, Okla.:

"Sewage water was backing up in one room. A dead mouse was in the corner of one cooler. Putrid water standing in a hole in the floor and cracks in the floor contained bloody, stinking water. No attempt to screen flies from the building."

In a 1967 report, investigators said that the Ricks Packing Co., Aiken, S.C., was using "unclean pork fat in products" and that meat in the freezer was covered with dirty ice from refrigeration coils.

In a 1962 investigation of Brown & Scott Packing Co., Wilmington, Del., investigators said: "Walls splattered with decomposing meats and meat by-products. Massive evidence of vermin and rodent poison used indiscriminately. Steak tenderizing solution contained three dead flies and one dead wasp."

Investigators praised conditions at the Copeland Sausage Co., Alachua, Fla.; Beavers Packing Co., Newnan, Ga.; Callhan & Co., Peoria, Ill.; Hitch Packing Co., Princeton, Ind.; and Kessler's, Inc., Lemoyne, Pa.

The following list summarizes conditions reported by USDA investigators in both 1962 and 1967 in other plants that are members of N.I.M.P.A.:

ALABAMA—1962

R. L. Zeigler, Inc., Bessemer, Ala.—Sanitation at plant only fair and below Federal standards; evidence that hams were being pumped with close to 20 per cent water.

ARKANSAS—1962

Heard's Sausage Company, Searcy, Ark.—Fairly new plant with equipment and sanitation adequate; however, state provided only periodic inspection.

COLORADO—1967

Stauffer Food Company, Rocky Ford, Colo.—Meat being processed into sausage products was not clean; pork trimmings contains skin with hog hair still on it; coolers dirty and covered with mold; chopper leaking grease directly into meat product.

FLORIDA—1962

Dirr's Gold Seal, Meats, Inc., Miami, Fla.—

Well constructed plant with good equipment but during slaughter waste water drained from ceiling and trolley onto carcass.

Loeb & Gottfried, Hialeah, Fla.—Numerous flies on killing floor contaminating meat during slaughter, several beef carcasses covered with dirt from killing floor.

Harman Sausage Company, Inc., Tampa, Fla.—Killing floor very poorly equipped and filth splashed onto beef carcass during washing; grease and rust from trolley hooks on carcasses.

Tarnow Food Delicacies, Inc., Tampa, Fla.—Hams being opened under peeling paint from ceiling; no control over addition of non-fat dry milk during sausage production.

Jones Chambliss Company, Jacksonville, Fla.—Necks of cattle carcass dragging on floor; ceiling in sausage holding room peeling with paint falling into the product.

GEORGIA—1962

Thomas Packing Co., Griffin, Ga.—Plant seriously overcrowded and procedures in processing portions are not those that would be considered acceptable under federal inspection.

ILLINOIS—1967

Streck Bros. Packing Co., Belleville, Ill.—"Poor sanitation and housekeeping; believed to slaughter cripples and downers."

ILLINOIS—1962

Streck Bros. Packing Co.—Dirty hogs head soaking in water; believe carcasses contaminated with killing floor dirt; (plant is not acceptable from structural, operational or sanitary standpoint).

Bartlow Brothers, Inc., Rushville, Ill.—No trichinosis control exercised on cured, smoked or cooked pork; no control over addition of water to hams.

Virginia Packing Co., Virginia, Ill.—Cooking of frankfurters and bologna in wood tanks; bacon press boxes heavily encrusted.

Circle Packing Corp., E. St. Louis, Ill.—Scraps of meat on walls in killing floor area. Scaling paint on ceiling of sausage cook room; a few roaches observed.

Leons Sausage Co., Chicago, Ill.—Floor of pork cooler was not drained and dirty wooden floor racks were present. Rusty barrels containing grease sitting in basement room.

Slotkowski Sausage Co., Chicago, Ill.—Evidence that sodium phosphate, not allowed under federal standards, was being added to sausages; evidence that ham being pumped with 15 per cent water.

INDIANA—1967

Elkhart Packing Co., Elkhart, Ind.—Largest non-federally inspected slaughtering and processing plant in the state. Overhead rails for movement of beef quarters rusty and grease covered; walls and tables dirty in sausage department and screen covered with fat and grease; equipment contaminated and rusty in cutting room.

Parrot Packaging Co., Ft. Wayne, Ind.—Killing floor is small and would not meet federal standards, no veterinary supervision for determination of diseased lesions.

Laurents Packing Co., Ft. Wayne—Sanitation could be improved; beef cooler in need of repair and does not meet federal standards.

INDIANA—1962

Valentine Co., Inc., Terre Haute, Ind.—No screens on windows and many flies inside plant; dirt and hair on carcasses; no sinks for handwashing.

Bloomington Packing Co., Bloomington, Ind.—Flies entering basement of plant through open window in sausage room; Inspector noted: "Sanitation was worse than any I have previously observed," and added that many flies were killed on the inside surface of one sausage truck.

IOWA—1962

Nissen & Sons Packing Co., Webster City, Ia.—No inspection of paunches, lymph glands and abdominal viscera; most equipment in